Friday 25 May 2012

Pennies and Dimes and the 99%

It was this time last year that I fell out of love with London.  I was staying in a three story walk-up flat, in Kensington.  Close to shops, tube, and some great pubs.  And walking distance to the Chelsea Flower Show and Q&A amongst other museums.  From my bower window I could sit in the afternoon spring sun and watch the pedestrians far below, hithering and thithering.

Kensington was dirty, and the people grasping.  The young women wore stiletto heals that were reminiscent of the foot binding days of the Chinese.  All the shops had sales, although I am not a shopper, it was noticeable that along the strip the retailers were doing it tough.  Clear signals of a weak economy. 

The fact that it rained most of the week could have also contributed to my gloom.  In one day alone we had boiling heat, torrential and flooding thunderstorm, hail, and a wind storm.  

Across the street from my flat, and a floor lower was a gorgeous apartment.  Decorated and furnished in the old English style it was immaculate, with real old world charm.  The curtains were always open as though the owner was inviting people to glance in and admire.  

The owner himself was of old world charm style, an English gentleman.  Maybe ex military, because he stood tall and ramrod straight despite his clearly many years, and groomed to within an inch.  

As I sat in the evening, it was the only time I saw him, despite having a clear view the entire length of his apartment.  At that time, he would sit beside the window and read the paper, on occasion leaning into the window as the light faded, holding up the paper.  

Maybe I am slow, but it took a few days to realise that he was using daylight to read by rather than turn on an overhead light.  And further, that I at no time when glancing out the window saw lights – either overhead or from a flickering TV – in the evening.  In the kitchen, I only ever saw tin cans on the bench, despite the inviting décor.  It took me a little time to understand that all over London some, like this elderly gentleman living in a million pound apartment, and others less fortunate, were not turning on the lights nor cooking, because they couldn’t afford it from their income.  I wasn’t just the poorer demographic.  The seemingly wealthy were suffering also.  

And maybe like this gentleman, they lived a proud existence, and told nobody for the shame.

I have written about inflation and ivory towers, in which I suggested that the governments would soon (and again) be adjusting how they measure inflation to grab back money on say, pensions.  Inflation is a number on which the whole world spins, whether measuring real investment returns, pensions adjustments, or planning for future expenditure.  

And that the western economies are experiencing stagflation, whereby the cost of essentials – food, water, energy, healthcare – are rising faster than the income on which we rely to meet these essentials.  And I don’t see how it is going to be any better for decades.  (I took my own advice and bought a farm.)

Then a month ago there was this extraordinary article, as if to prove me completely correct.  So that I am sure you have the benefit of reading it (and the following comments) here is the link in full.


I learnt various things from this article.  First, that Bloomberg now had its own editors publishing editorials.  When did that happen?  Second, that they also posted comments about an editorial.  Again, since when?  Third that Bloomberg is still getting its facts wrong.  Evan when written by the “editors” themselves, whose primary role is, after all, to edit the facts.  

Here is the opening line:  Sadly, Congress and the White House seem incapable of agreeing on substantive measures to tackle the $10.4 trillion mountain of U.S. debt.”

Now the interesting thing about that line, is that the US debt is in fact US$15 trillion, because I looked it up on Bloomberg.  

The article then goes on (the “slam dunk” in the heading is a tip to its quality) to say that the government should switch to a Chained Inflation measure rather than the standard measure used today.  

Chained inflation is a measure, that reputedly tracks changes in consumer purchasing behaviour.  The example they use is that when the price of a granny smith apple rises, the consumer switches to the lower cost red delicious apple.  

Now, for sure you are getting the drift.  As inflation on food essentials (as an example) keeps rising, people will continuously switch to lower and lower cost products.  Cat food comes to mind, as it did to the many commentators who overwhelmingly mocked this article.  Dog bones anybody?  What inflation?

The “editors” suggested that this would save the government US$300 billion over ten years.  No suggestion how this was going to pay down the debt.  And at 0.2% it isn’t even enough to pay the interest on the debt. 

And you guessed it, the savings came from:  social security and cost of living adjustments;  pensions; and probably food stamp recipients.  The 99%. 

And again this turns to a continuing theme in this blog – penny and diming the 99% whilst the 1% carry on.  As pointed out in prior blogs, taxing the OTC derivative market, US$700 trillion and counting, just 0.1%, would raise US$700 billion.  And if the duration of the OTC market is 3 months, that would be US$2.8 trillion per year, or enough to pay off the USA debt in total plus a huge surplus using Bloomberg’s 10 year measure.  

Of course the USA is not the home to all the global derivatives, but probably a lot of them.  There would be quite a material amount in other financial centres such as London.  

And you guessed it, the Telegraph reports that that government is about to pennie and dime its citizens by adjusting how the RPI is measured.  That's the retail price index.

It reports “A reduction in RPI would save the Government up to £3bn a year on the interest payments it makes on index-linked gilts, but would also slash income for pensioners and those whose pay packages are linked to the measure.”

Like the pension for that charming elderly gentleman living in Kensington.  Or should I say, surviving, just! 

Friday 18 May 2012

All wrong on JP Morgan

In our Pennies and Dimes blog in April, we identified that JP Morgan had US$70 trillion of derivative exposure at the end of 2011, of a total market of ~US$707 trillion.  So it had 10% of the market. 

We argued that if governments wacked these OTC derivatives onto an exchange and then taxed the market at 0.1% turnover then it would generate US$700 billion in tax revenue and is easily the slam dunk for the global debt problems (see tomorrow’s blog).  Taking it further, if the average life of each derivative was 4 months (qtr – but the total global portfolio of derivatives may well be a bit longer) then total tax revenue would be four times US$700 billion per annum = US$2.8 trillion.  Enough to bail out Italy I believe, and certainly enough to pay off some of USA government debts. 

Continuing this theme, we then blogged on the massive US$1.5 trillion in excess reserves held with the Fed by the US banks.  We raised the question “Why hoard expensive capital, with the toll on profits given there is little place to invest it with much return, unless you are (i) scared out of your wits about another mighty downturn and massive liquidity crunch or (ii) there is a lot of short term risk (OTC derivatives?) they may have but we do not know, against which they are holding this capital (and not required by prudential standards).”

And followed on with the distrust on counter parties being a rationale for this excess capital – and as it turned out for good reason.

Then of course we learnt of the rating agencies demands that (To Big To Fail) banks must hold much greater capital relative to that required for “prudential” guidelines to ensure that they have their derivative exposure covered in the event of loss.  Or indeed any margin call on their leveraged books.  Remember you and I bailed them out last time so this is a good thing.  Again, this is all about counter party risk and who gets shafted if one makes a blunder.  So we were correct on both fronts with respect to the excess capital: derivative cover and counter party risk. 

And as an aside, making the prudential guidelines for capital meaningless as clearly the market is dictating the terms of capital guidelines.

So, thennnnn………JPMorgan blows up US$2 billion.  As I said this story theme just keeps giving.  And of course it is now reported to be close to US$3 billion (in Bloomies) as the market vampires sink their teeth into the unwinding artery and suck.  Heh heh heh!!

There are several points here, again that I have not seen written about.  But first, if I had picked up this theme in April – and I am not in the market these days – then the market knew about JPM at least as early as April, and this has since been reported as correct.  

The second thing is that JPM was reputedly trying to hedge long tail risk in its book – or total portfolio.  And people have been jumping up and down about this being a hedging exercise rather than a portfolio (b/s) risk management exercise (and hence the Volker Rule in the USA must be passed).  Frankly I disagree with all of it.  There is nothing wrong with hedging your whole portfolio.  Fund managers do it by asset allocating (if they are long only) and insurance companies do it by laying off risk, either in tranches of value or tranches of time.  Perfectly acceptable.

But what possibly was happening at JPM which is unforgiveable was that it was only participating in a meme – an imitation of what is a very trendy risk management tool in investment banks at the moment: hedging out your long tail risk.  So, sadly, they were actually just doing it for trendy reasons rather than for strategic risk management.  Or maybe I am wrong and should give them more credit (no pun intended) for independent thinking.

The problem with all this is that long tail risk is meant to be covered by / with (i) today’s profits stored in reserves until the risk expires (ii) the pricing mechanism when the lending business (which in aggregate makes up the whole portfolio) is actually written, or struck.  That is, the margin above the risk free rate which is composed of credit risk, liquidity risk, etc.

So, to want to hedge your long tail risk, you should be reserving profits today AND pricing your risk (especially on long term business) correctly.  

So one of these two things at JPM must have changed if we are to give them credit for making sound rationale for hedging their long tail risk (and not just imitating the meme).   Either they are reserving insufficient capital for long tail risk, or they have miss – priced their book when the business was written.

OR we are completely wrong in all of this and they were just prop trading.  A big no no. 

But back to giving them some credit.  The (now) US$3 billion they have lost is just 0.004% of their reported derivatives exposure.  (Which leads my blood pressure to rise:  what if they had lost more?)  I mean, really, it is hardly risk taking is it?  That is, if you measure it against their total derivative exposure of US$70 trillion. And as a loss to book is concerned, it is still only 12 basis points or 0.12%.  Loose change.

Where the first problem comes in:  why do you need US$70 trillion of derivatives to protect a ~US$2.5 trillion book?  That is 28 times.  And if it is intended to be a hedge of their book rather than a punt, then it should in theory always be net neutral so it is highly unlikely – even black swan events – to be losing money.  (But you could argue that a .004% loss on US$70 trillion is virtually net neutral).

So why is everybody jumping up and down.  Frankly, I do not believe they have thought it through.  Just doing back of the envelope numbers; capital on the US$2.5 billion book would be US$250 billion assuming 10%.   So they have lost a little over 1% of capital. 

Which leads to the second: what if they lose 1% of their derivative book?  That would be US$700 billion, or nearly three times capital reserves.  So in theory, JPM would need to increase their capital base 3X to maintain an AAA counter party rating, if a 1% margin call was the criteria. 

When you are 10% of the total market – you are at multiplies of greater risk for it to move against you - whether punting or hedging.  This is the position JPM finds itself, and frankly should have been smart enough to price this illiquidity when hedging its book.  And there are other practical issues, such as the market turning for other unrelated reasons when you are in the process of placing your “net neutral” position.  I mean, their loss is so small on a relative basis, this is probably what happened, together with the market dominance risk above.

No, I think everybody is looking in the wrong direction.  Banks and other risk takers are meant to take and manage / mitigate their risk to optimise profits.  

The real problem is the scale of the derivative market.  JPM exposure (and every other bank) should have a limit on it (think of the concentration in AIG in 2008).  THAT would make them think how to use it more judiciously.  I mean US$70 trillion for US$2.5 trillion?  That’s the problem.  

Tuesday 8 May 2012

Oh dear!!

Politicususa published a list of thirty pieces of Republican legislation introduced to government [s] in the Obama term that they considered the Republicans War On America.  Their view was that Republicans are using these legislation to destroy America.  We republished their headings, but also gave access to the very very detailed and impressive research they had done to support their thesis.


One piece of legalisation in this honourable list was called “The War on Human Foetuses in Food” , which they poohed poohed as representing how mad the Republicans are.

Wrong guys.  The Republicans had every conceivable reason to suggest, and probably pass this legislation if this report in the Daily Mail can be believed.

In South Korea, customs intercepted cargo that included more than 17,000 capsules containing powder made from dried aborted Chinese babies.  

Frankly, I have nothing more to say on that.

However, the number of wars will now have to be 29.  

Monday 7 May 2012

Right Not to Trust (the Fed)



So we have been writing about the massive excessive reserves of the USA banks held with the Fed Reserve.  At an official rate of 0.25% (in the "prudential market" lets call it) versus more than 3% in the capital market.   The opportunity cost seemed large, let alone the US$18 trillion lost lending.  Hmmmm!!!


Excess reserves of course, is capital reserves in excess of reserves required under prudential guidelines.


We concluded that this US$1.5 trillion hoard of excess reserves was as a consequence of a loss of trust between bank counter parties and / or (ii) there is a lot of short term risk (OTCderivatives?) they [banks] may have but we do not know, against which they are holding this capital (and not required by prudential standards).

And via zerohedge we have the answer…..and it turns out we were correct.   The banks do not trust each other and the banks require substantial extra capital in the event of the credit downgrade.   A credit downgrade would trigger derivative margin calls, and those margin calls would need to be capitalised.  

For example, Morgan Stanley has just filed its 10-Q with the SEC, and shows that it requires another US$10 billion.  About another third of its current capital base.   So that in the event that it is downgraded three levels by a rating agency, it has sufficient capital to cover its margin calls.  

Let's also recall that the derivative market is reputedly US$700 trillion.  And further that Morgan Stanley, our example, is one of those Too Big Too Fail designated banks, that in the event of a failure are backed by the government.  So we know in advance that it will be bailed out.

So why call it "excess capital" Fed?  It is not excess.  It is in fact the level of capital required to maintain its  credit rating.  You could call it the amount that the banks require so that you (Fed) do not have to spend my money bailing them out.  If their shareholders are earning the revenue on these derivatives, they should carry the cost of offloading the risk as well.  [In a previous blog we also referred to reading a Federal Reserve piece on the excess reserves that frankly was a crock of.   Serious shortcomings there.]

It should be required capital to have the capacity to cover your derivative margin calls.  Looks to me like the rating agencies are doing the Fed’s job for them.  For a change, I should add.

Saturday 5 May 2012

Global trade like a drunken sailor


A couple of weeks ago there were several articles about how the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) was out of favour.    Or to be more precise, that it had lost its relevance.  Too much shipping supply and not enough global demand had compounded within the index to push it to the lowest level in recorded history.  One article in the Telegraph (I think) suggested that the ships are worth more as scrap than for the primary purpose. 

For those who are unfamiliar with this index, Seekingalpha.com describes it as:
The BDI is a shipping and trade index created by the London-based Baltic Exchange that measures changes in the cost to transport raw materials such as metals, grains and fossil fuels by sea. The Baltic Exchange directly contacts shipping brokers to assess price levels for a given route, product to transport and time to delivery (speed). For shipping companies, a higher BDI is better than a lower one as it means that they will get to charge more for their services.

I was going to write about it back then, that the articles were simply wrong.  The index is doing no more than it should, showing exactly where the global economy is functioning.  There is oversupply in many parts of the economic world:  labour, money, cars, trucks, houses etc etc, and shipping.  And whatever index you follow, when that happens indexes go down when the bubbles burst.


But the blog didn’t get written, and now if you search for news on the web for the Baltic Dry Index, there is an enormous number of news articles.  Why?  Because the index is, like a drunken sailor, lifting itself off the floor.  Up more than 60% in the past few months. 

And seekingalpha.com explains in its article why the various shipping companies are good investments right now.  And the arguments are strong – with Price/Book discounts of 80% or more.  Assuming that they do not go bankrupt before, any minor improvement in global economy will reap substantial rewards with small movements in the share price.  And many an international investor has made their money buying ships cheap and selling them into a growing market.  The Greek shipping magnates come to mind. 

But you know what?  This just doesn’t look like a resuming global boom to me.  It looks like a drunken sailor.  But there is one thing for certain, the index is not broken.  It is telling you that the global economy continues to be severely tough. 

Wednesday 2 May 2012

USA Civil War

In this blog we wrote about what appeared to be the civil war in many countries and includng the USA.  And those views haven't changed.

To celebrate the 1st May Labour Day, Politicususa published an astounding piece.    Called......

The Dirty Thirty – Occupy May Day Edition